摘要
我国的国有企业所有权与经营权相分离理论是特定历史条件下的产物,在国有企业建立现代企业制度的背景下,已经失去了正当性,不仅无存在的价值,而且为政府不当干预国有企业的经营活动提供了借口,必须对其深刻检讨。国家所有的财产投入到国有企业后,就不再属于国家所有,而是属于被投资的国有企业所有,国家取得的对价是出资人权。经营自主权是国有企业作为营利法人所固有的,不是国家授予的。国有企业不存在所有权与经营权相分离的基础和理据。现代企业存在的出资人权与企业控制权相分离的“两权分离”现象,与所有权与经营权相分离的含义相距甚远。现代企业中“两权分离”的权利主体分别是出资人和企业管理者,是企业内部的“两权分离”,反映了本应属于出资人的控制权旁落到了管理者的手中,导致了“内部人控制”这一弊病,这是要解决的问题。国有企业所有权与经营权相分离理论中“两权分离”的权利主体分别是企业财产的所有人和企业本身,涉及的是企业与外部的关系,是作为处理企业与政府关系的原则和解决政企不分问题的对策被人为设计出来的,是解决问题的方法。
The theory of separating ownership from management rights in state-owned enterprises is a product under certain historical conditions which has lost its legitimacy against the background of establishing modern enterprise system in state-owned enterprises.Not only is there no value in its existence but also it provides an excuse for the government to intervene in the operations of state-owned enterprises which will cause endless trouble so profound critique is needed. After the state-owned property is invested in state-owned enterprises it is no longer owned by the state but owned by the invested state-owned enterprises.In turn the state obtains investor’s rights. The autonomy in management is inherent to stateowned enterprises as a judicial person for profit but not granted by the state. There shall not exist the separation of ownership from management rights in state-owned enterprises. There is a phenomenon of "separation of two rights" in modern enterprises that is separating rights of investors from the control of enterprises which is quite different from the meaning of the separation of ownership from management rights. The "separation of two rights" in modern enterprises in which the subjects of "two rights" are investors and enterprise managers respectively is the "separation of two rights" within enterprises reflecting that the control right which should belong to investors falls into the hands of management leading to the malady of "insider control" which is a problem to be solved. The "separation of two rights" in the theory of separating ownership from management rights in state-owned enterprises in which the subjects of the "two rights" are the owners of the enterprise property and the enterprises themselves involves the relationship between the enterprises and outsiders and artificially designed to serve as the principle of dealing with the relationship between enterprises and the government and the response to solving the problem of integration of government administrations with enterprises which is a method for solving a problem.
出处
《政治与法律》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第8期138-150,共13页
Political Science and Law
基金
国家社科基金重点项目“国有股权行使法律问题研究”(项目编号:13AFX018)的研究成果之一
关键词
国有企业
所有权
经营权
所有权与经营权相分离
State - owned Enterprises
Ownership
Management Rights
Separation of Ownership from Management Rights