供应链视角下考虑社会总福利的政府最优碳税

Government’s Optimal Carbon Tax Decision from the Perspective of Supply Chain

基于政府、制造商和零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,综合考虑了政府治理环境污染的成本、供应链利润和消费者剩余等因素,从政府的角度出发,研究了如何制定最优碳税税率使得社会总福利最大化。结果表明:对于清洁型制造商,碳税的增加会使供应链利润和消费者剩余增加;对于污染型制造商和中间型制造商,碳税的增加会使供应链利润和消费者剩余下降;对于高污染型制造商,随着碳税的增加,制造商碳排放量也增加,而对于非高污染型制造商,碳税的增加会促进制造企业降低碳排放。因此,为保证社会总福利最大化,碳税的制定必须控制在一个合理范围,就此给出了社会总福利最大条件下政府最优碳税的隐性解。

Based on the Stackelberg game model of government,manufacturers and retailers,considering the government's governance of environmental pollution costs,supply chain profit and consumer surplus,from the government's point of view,how to set the optimal carbon tax rate to maximize the welfare of the whole society is studied.The results show that for cleaner manufacturers,the increase in carbon tax will increase supply chain profit and consumer surplus;for polluting manufacturers and intermediate manufacturers,the increase in carbon tax will reduce supply chain profits and consumer surplus;for highly polluting manufacturers,as carbon taxes increase,manufacturers'carbon emissions also increase,while for non-high-pollution manufacturers,an increase in carbon taxes will encourage manufacturing companies to reduce carbon emissions.Therefore,in order to ensure the maximum of social welfare,the development of carbon tax must be controlled within a reasonable range.