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物联网技术改进下制造商和零售商合作机制研究 被引量:2

The Cooperation Mechanism of Manufacturer and Retailer Based on the Internet of Things Technology Improvement
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摘要 本文以入口产品制造商进行物联网技术改进对非入口产品产生溢出效应为背景,构建由一个入口产品制造商、一个非入口产品制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链,从零售商与制造商同时实现帕累托改进的角度研究了零售商与入口产品制造商基于成本分担合同的合作机制。研究结果表明,零售商分担一定比例的物联网技术成本能同时实现零售商和两个制造商利润的帕累托改进并提高物联网技术水平。最后当物联网技术成本系数高于阈值且成本分担比例在较大的范围内时成本分担合同下物联网技术水平比零售商和入口产品制造商纵向联盟下的最优技术水平更高。 Based on improving the IoT technology of the product what is the traffic entrance has the spillover effect on the product what is not the traffic entrance,we construct a two-echelon supply chain composed with one retailer,one manufacturer whose product is the traffic entrance and one manufacturer whose product is not the traffic entrance,then research the cooperative mechanism between retailer and traffic entrance product manufacturer with cost sharing contract from the perspective of Pareto improvement.The results show that the retailer shares some cost of improving IoT technology for the traffic entrance product manufacturer,which can simultaneously achieve Pareto improvement of profits for above three members and improve the technological level of IoT.Finally,when the cost coefficient of IoT technology is higher than the threshold and the cost-sharing ratio is in a larger range,the technological level of IoT under the cost sharing contract is higher than that of under the vertical integration.
作者 钟丽 艾兴政 汪敢甫 ZHONG Li;AI Xing-zheng;WANG Gan-fu(School of Economics and Management,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China;School of Business Administration,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China)
出处 《预测》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第4期83-89,共7页 Forecasting
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372140,71572030) 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71432003,71531003)
关键词 物联网 技术改进 溢出效应 成本分担合同 IoT technology improvement spillover effect cost sharing contract
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