买方市场势力对下游企业产品质量创新激励的影响

Impact of Buyers’ Market Power on Innovation Incentives of Product Quality in Downstream Enterprises

构建了由垄断制造商和下游寡头竞争企业组成的纵向产品质量差异化模型考察下游生产高质量产品的大规模企业在具有市场势力前后各交易主体的质量创新激励问题和市场均衡结果的变化情况.研究表明当下游不同质量水平的企业均无市场势力时任何一方的产品质量提升均会激励其竞争对手的创新积极性当下游大规模企业具有市场势力且与上游制造商进行合作谈判时下游两家企业的批发价格和零售价格均随市场势力的增强而有所降低.与此同时合作谈判交易模式前后下游两家企业的批发价格、零售价格以及市场销量的变化情况均取决于买方市场势力的大小而小规模企业的市场销量与利润收益始终保持不变.

A vertical product quality differentiation model consisting of monopolistic manufacturers and downstream oligarchic competitors was constructed. Based on this model, the changes in quality-innovating incentives and market equilibrium results were investigated before and after the downstream large-scale enterprises with high-quality products had market power. Research showed that when downstream enterprises at different quality levels all have no market power, the quality promotion of any party will stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of its competitors. When a downstream large-scale enterprise has market power and negotiates with an upstream manufacturer, the wholesale prices and the retail prices of the two downstream enterprises will decline with the increase of market power. At the same time, the wholesale prices, retail prices and market sales of the two downstream companies all depend on buyers’ market power while the sales and profitability of small-scale enterprises remain unchanged.