期刊文献+

共享经济主体履约机制研究——以共享单车为例的博弈分析 被引量:1

Research on the Performance Mechanism of the Players of Sharing Economy——Game Theoretical Analysis of Bike-Sharing
下载PDF
导出
摘要 依托于技术变革,借助于平台中介模式,以共享单车为典型的共享经济崭露头角.但是,在发展中也产生很多问题,如安装私锁,平台方挪用押金,押金难退等问题,道德风险已成为其发展的严重阻碍.本文以共享单车为例,依据效用理论构建博弈模型并进行均衡分析,对共享经济参与主体的履约机制及影响因素进行研究,探讨共享单车企业和消费者的行为互动,从行业运营的内在机理出发,研究上述现象产生的根源以及解决问题的关键,研究发现:短期博弈中惩罚机制的不足将导致博弈陷入囚徒困境;在长期重复博弈中,合作性的博弈均衡能够出现,声誉和信任机制起到关键作用,在消费者以及企业有足够的声誉让对方相信不会率先违约时,企业利润、消费者效用水平、惩罚水平以及耐心程度越高,成本越低,则双方越没有动机首先偏离均衡.在此基础上,本文对共享经济发展提出了相应建议,为共享单车的治理提供了参考. Depending on the technological change and the platform intermediary mode, the sharing economy, which is typical of bike-sharing, has developed rapidly. However, in the process of development, there are some problems such as malicious damage to vehicles, installation of private locks by consumers, and embezzlement of deposits, hard to withdraw deposits by platform parties, and so on. Moral hazard has become a serious obstacle to its development.Taking bike sharing as an example, based on utility theory,this paper presents game theoretical models and conducts equilibrium analysis on players of sharing economy to study the performance mechanism and influencing factors of the participants in the sharing economy,and discusses the behavior interaction between Bike-sharing enterprises and consumers.Starting from the internal mechanism of industry operation,we study the root causes of the above phenomenon and the key to solve the problem.Then the results show that: In addition, lack of punishment mechanism in one-shot game will lead to the prisoner’s dilemma. While in repeated game, cooperative game equilibrium can occur.Reputation and trust mechanisms play a key role. When consumers and businesses have enough reputations to convince the other believe that they will not default first, the higher the level of corporate profits, consumer utility, penalties and patience, the lower the cost, the less motivation for both parties to deviate from equilibrium first. Based on these findings, this paper puts forward some suggestions for the development of the sharing economy, and provides insights for governance of bike-sharing.
作者 王帆 石岿然 张振荣 Wang Fan;Shi Kui-Ran;Zhang Zhen-Rong(School of Finance, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China)
出处 《江苏商论》 2019年第7期56-61,共6页 Jiangsu Commercial Forum
基金 国家社科基金重点项目:共享经济下道德风险控制与信任机制构建研究(18AGL001)
关键词 共享经济 共享单车 履约机制 均衡分析 sharing economy bike sharing performance mechanism equilibrium analysis
  • 相关文献

参考文献14

二级参考文献86

  • 1俞燕.保护城市自行车交通及建立城市绿色交通系统[J].现代城市研究,1999,14(2):37-40. 被引量:11
  • 2杨扬,陈幼林,王孝坤.绿色交通理念下的城市交通规划[J].城市公共交通,2004(6):11-13. 被引量:6
  • 3Paulo Sergio Custodio.绿色交通相关问题概述[J].城市交通,2007,5(4):34-38. 被引量:17
  • 4拉坦,1994.《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯,阿尔钦,诺斯等前引书,上海三联书店.
  • 5彭文生:《共享经济是新的增长点》,《证券日报》2015年9月12日.
  • 6道格拉斯·C.诺思:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,陈郁、罗华半译,上海:上海三联书店,1991年,第190页.
  • 7埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆:《公共资源的未来:超越市场失灵和政府管制》,郭冠清译,北京:中囤人民大学出版社,2015年,第27页.
  • 8Paul Ehrich and Anne Ehrieh, Extinction: The Causes and Consequences of the Disappearance of Species, New York: Random House, 1981, p. 79.
  • 9《2014移动出行白皮书:规律汁划出行成趋势》,乐活中国·中国网,https://www.10has.china.COI/1.cn,2015年3月8日.
  • 10道格拉斯·c.诺思:《理解经济变迁过程》,钟正生、邢华译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008年,第147页.

共引文献595

同被引文献9

引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部