期刊文献+

行动的理由能作为行动的证据吗?

Reasons for Action as Evidence for Action?
原文传递
导出
摘要 卡恩斯和斯塔尔提出“理由作为证据”的论题,并论证了“一个人实施某一行动的理由是他应当实施该行动的证据”。围绕“行动的正当性”这一主张所展开的争论最为激烈。这一主张的实质是:行动主体行动的规范性理由和他行动的规范性证据是共外延的,并且由此可引申出事实性的行动理由与行动证据的等同。一种“证据性理由”能把握行动理由与行动证据之间的这种关联。 Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently proposed the thesis of“Reasons as Evidence”,and mainly argued that a reason to take a particular action is simply evidence that one ought to take this action. The most controversial point of this claim has been on the rightness of action. The essence of this claim can be expressed as: the normative reasons and the normative evidence for one’s actions are co - extensive,this brings us the suggestion that factive reasons for one’s actions are equal to his evidence for these actions. Moreover,a special kind of reasons named“evidential reasons”can hold this connection between reasons and evidence for action.
作者 张若思 王淑庆 ZHANG Ruo-si;WANG Shu-qing(Department of Philosophy,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China;Department of Philosophy,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,China)
出处 《科学技术哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第4期22-27,共6页 Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金 教育部人文社会科学基金项目“理性行动的认知规范研究”(19YJC720006) 南京大学优秀博士研究生创新能力提升计划B项目“威廉姆森的证据思想研究”(201801B001)
关键词 理由作为证据 理由 证据 共外延 事实性 reasons as evidence reasons evidence co - extensive factive
  • 相关文献

参考文献2

二级参考文献32

  • 1G. Anscombe: Intention, Oxford: Blackwell, 1957, p.5.
  • 2D. Davidson: "Actions, Reasons and Causes", Journal of Philosophy, 1963, 60 (23): p.685.
  • 3M. Smith: The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p.95.
  • 4D. Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. Selby-Bigge and P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, 2.3.3.
  • 5D. Davidson: "Actions, Reasons and Causes", Journal of Philosophy, 1963, 60 (23): p.687.
  • 6S. Everson: "What Are Reasons for Action?", in New Essays on the Explanation of Action, edited by C. Sandis, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.22.
  • 7J. Dancy: Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.129.
  • 8C.Sandis: "Can ActionExplanations Ever Be Non-Factive?", in Thinking About Reasons: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Dancy, edited by D. Bakhurst, B. Hooker, and M. Little, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.32. D.
  • 9Davidson: "Actions, Reasons and Causes", Journal of Philosophy, 1963, 60 (23): p.685.
  • 10J. Raz: Engaging Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.63.

共引文献9

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部