内部控制能扎紧董监高的机会主义减持藩篱吗

Can Internal Control Fasten the Fence of Insiders’ Opportunistic Sales?

近年来,董监高减持行为引发了监管当局和投资者的广泛关注,如何规范和约束董监高减持行为成为财务学界聚焦的重要问题。由此,本文基于公司层面监管视角考察了内部控制对董监高的机会主义减持行为是否具有治理效应。研究发现,高质量内部控制显著地降低了董监高减持的择机性,表明内部控制对董监高的机会主义减持行为具有治理效应;这一治理效应在法制环境较好地区更为显著,而在民营企业与国有企业之间均较为显著,无显著差异。进一步检验发现,内部控制能有效抑制董监高减持的信息优势,部分说明了内部控制发挥治理效应的机理。本研究有助于规范.董监高减持行为和检验内部控制制度在我国的执行效果。

In recent years, insider sales caused wide attention from regulators and investors. How to regulate and restrict insider sales becomes a hot topic of financial academia. Based on the perspectives of firm regulation level, this paper investigates whether internal control has governing effect on insiders' opportunistic sales. We find higher quality internal control can restrain insiders from timing their sales. This result indicates that internal control has governing effect on insiders' opportunistic sales. This governing effect is more significant in the better legal environment. And there is no significant dis tinction between state-owned firms and private firms for the governing effect of internal control. Further, we find that internal control can reduce the insiders' information superiority. The result indicates that the information superiority has partial mediating effect in the relationship between them. The re search of this paper is helpful to regulate insiders, stock selling behavior and test the implementation effect of internal control systems in China.