纵向兼任高管、产权性质与股价崩盘风险

Vertical Interlocks of Executives,Ownership and Stock Price Crash Risk

本文以2011-2015年A股上市公司为样本,研究了纵向兼任高管对股价崩盘风险的影响,并探讨了其中的作用机制。研究发现,纵向兼任高管会显著提升股价崩盘风险,且该不利影响主要发生在非国有企业中,作用机制在于大股东通过纵向兼任高管加强了对上市公司的控制,引致了更为严重的大股东掏空。进一步研究发现,相比总经理纵向兼任,董事长纵向兼任会显著提高股价崩盘风险。随着兼任强度的增大,公司股价崩盘风险越高。

Taking China s 2011-2015 A-share listed companies as a sample,this paper examines the effects of vertical interlocks of executives on stock price crash risk.The paper finds that vertical interlocks of executives increases stock price crash risk,mainly occurring in non-state-owned enterprises.The mechanism lies in that with vertical interlocks of executives,top shareholder causes more serious tunneling.Further research finds that compared with CEO vertical interlock,this negative effect mainly exists in companies with chairman vertical interlock;the higher the vertical interlock intensity,the higher stock price crash risk.