考虑决策周期影响的离散契约供应链动力学行为

Dynamic Behaviors of Discrete Contract of Supply Chain Based on Impact of Decision-Making Periods

在传统供应链中,生产商可以通过建立批发价和补贴的契约来实现对销售商的控制,达到稳定的均衡.但在一个具有离散动力学特性的复杂供应链系统中,均衡往往由于受到生产商自身决策策略及决策周期的影响,从而演变为一个具有一定周期的极限环形态.通过对一个典型的生产商与零售商结成的供应链契约模型进行差分化、理论分析、Matlab/Simulink仿真以及对模型中的补贴和库存Lyapunov指数的探讨,证实了供应链契约模型中的均衡状态,在某些参数设置下,会因为决策周期和决策条件的变化,产生震荡,直至混沌.

In the traditional supply chain, the manufacturer can control the retailers by establishing wholesale price and subsidy to achieve a stable equilibrium.However, in a complex supply chain system with discrete dynamics, the equilibrium often evolves into a limit cycle with a certain period because of the influence of decision strategy and decision cycle of the manufacturer himself. First, this paper proposed the process of theoretical analysis. Next, it constructed a typical supply chain contract model based on manufacturers and retailers by differentiation and numerical calculation of the discrete dynamical system by using Matlab/Simulink. Finally, it discussed the Lyapunov exponent on subsidy and the inventory in the model. The result shows that the equilibrium in the supply chain contract model oscillates until chaos appears due to the change in decision cycle and decision criteria.