产权性质,独立董事任职地理距离与成本粘性

Property Right, Geographical Distance and Cost Stickiness of Independent Directors

以独立董事任职的地理距离为变量,以沪深A股2001—2017年上市公司为样本,探讨不同产权性质下独立董事任职的地理距离对成本粘性行为的影响。从地理距离的新视角为研究董事会独立性与成本粘性的关系提供参考。实证结果表明,独立董事本地任职能够增强其获取高质量信息的能力,提高对管理者的监督效率,减少管理者的“帝国建设”,从而抑制公司的成本粘性行为。以产权性质对样本分类进一步研究发现,相对于国有企业,民营企业独立董事本地任职对成本粘性的抑制作用更为显著。

Taking the geographical distance of employment independent directors as variable, and Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2017 as a research sample, it explores the impact of geographical distance of independent directors on cost stickiness under the different property rights. It provides a reference for studying the relationship between board independence and cost stickiness from the new perspective of geographical distance. The results show that the local independent directors can enhance their ability to obtain high-quality information, improve the supervision efficiency of managers, reduce the empire construction, and thus inhibit the company s cost stickiness behavior. Through further research on the classification of samples by property rights, it is found that the inhibition of cost stickiness by local independent directors is more significant in private enterprises than state-owned enterprises.