双重业绩反馈、内外部治理机制与战略风险承担

Dual Performance Feedback, Internal and External Governance Mechanism and Strategic Risk-Taking

风险承担是企业应对竞争的一种重要的战略适应行为。企业为何承担风险,何时承担风险,在当前经济转型与产业升级背景下,这些问题的探讨对企业的生存和发展具有重要的意义。本文基于企业行为理论,探讨了前瞻性与后视性双重业绩反馈对企业战略风险承担的联合作用机制及调节效应,得到以下结论:第一,从内部反馈看,当实际业绩低于内部期望目标时,业绩反馈越消极对企业战略风险承担的推动作用越强;第二,从外部反馈看,由分析师预测引致的分析师评估差距影响企业冒险决策,然而,内外双重业绩反馈对战略风险承担行为的联合作用并不显著,而是很大程度上依赖于企业的治理机制特征;第三,从内部治理机制视角,当董事会权力越大时,随着分析师评估差距扩大,企业决策者趋于保守,消极业绩反馈对战略风险承担的推动作用减弱;第四,从外部治理机制视角,当机构投资者持股比例越高时,随着分析师评估差距扩大,企业决策者倾向于激进,消极业绩反馈对战略风险承担的推动作用增强。本研究探讨了双重业绩反馈对企业战略风险承担的驱动机制,揭示了治理机制在企业战略冒险决策中的影响效应,为企业冒险行为研究与实践提供了理论参考。

Strategic risk taking is an adaptive behavior in response to competition and survival. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to discuss why firms take risks and how the corporate governance mechanism affects corporaterisk taking. From the perspective of organizational learning theory, corporate strategic decision process is also a process of continuous learning. Only through learning can we adapt ourselves to the rapidly changing environment. Organizations will learn not only from past experience,but also from current and possible future scenarios. Therefore,this paper combines the time and space dimension of organizational learning with the performance feedback paradigm,that is to say,enterprise behavior decision making is the combination of “backward looking” and “forward looking” thinking mode. Based on performance feedback model,the gap between performance expectation level and actual performance feedback forms a backward looking internal driving force of corporate risk taking behavior. For listed companies,the gap between analysts predicted performance and firm s actual performance forms a forward looking external driving force to promote firms to make strategic risk adjustments. However,corporate decision makers under different governance mechanisms will make different interpretations when dealing with double negative performance feedback,which will make the strategic risky choices heterogeneous. Therefore, based on the firm behavior theory,this study explores the joint mechanism of forward and backward looking performance feedback on firm s strategic risk taking behavior,and further examines the moderation effects of governance mechanism. Taking the high tech listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as a sample,and based on the combination of the backward looking performance feedback of the organizational expectations and the forward looking performance feedback caused by the analysts forecast,this paper explores the mechanism of dual performance feedback on corporate strategic risk taking,and explores the impact of analysts evaluation gap on the process of negative performance feedback from the perspective of governance mechanism, the findings show that:(1) From the backward looking perspective,as the performance aspiration gap (below aspirations) increases,the level of strategic risk taking increases;(2) From the forward looking perspective,the performance gap relative to analyst forecast influences the firm s risk taking decisions. However,the joint adjustment of analyst evaluation gap and governance factors can significantly influence the driving role of negative performance feedback on corporate strategic risk taking,that is,the actual adjustment role of analyst evaluation gap depends on the characteristics of corporate governance mechanism;(3) From the perspective of internal governance mechanism,when the power of the board of directors is higher,with the widening gap of analysts evaluation,the participation of the board of directors in decision making is enhanced,and the conflict of interests among different actors within the enterprise is enlarged,which weakens the role of negative performance feedback in promoting the strategic risk taking of the enterprise;(4) From the perspective of external governance mechanism,when the institutional investor s shareholding ratio is higher,with the widening gap of analysts evaluation,institutional investors strengthen their supervision and control functions on corporate governance behavior,restrain speculation and short sighted behavior,and thus promote enterprises with negative performance feedback to improve their strategic risk taking. This study incorporates analyst prediction into performance feedback decision making model,explores the mechanism of forward looking and backward looking dual performance feedback to bear strategic risk,deepens the impact path of capital market performance pressure on corporate strategic behavior,provides a new perspective for understanding the driving forces and differences of corporate strategic risk taking behavior,and enriches the theoretical framework of performance feedback based on multiple expectation goals. At the same time,from the perspective of board power and internal and external governance mechanism of institutional investors shareholding,this study explores the joint regulatory mechanism of analyst evaluation gap and governance mechanism characteristics on the process of negative performance feedback,reveals the effective boundary of negative performance feedback,expands the research on the contingency relationship between negative performance feedback and strategic risk taking,improves the deficiencies of previous performance feedback decision making models on the role of governance mechanism, and provides useful management reference for risk taking behavior decision making of high tech listed companies in the context of China s economic transformation.