混合所有制改革程度、政府隐性担保与国企过度负债

Mixed Ownership Reform,Government Implicit Guarantee and Excessive Debt of State-owned Enterprises

本文以2013-2017 年沪深 A 股国有上市公司为样本,手工收集年报披露的前十大股东中非国有股东持股与委派人员数据,分别从股权结构和高层治理结构两个维度衡量国有企业混合所有制改革程度,实证分析混合所有制改革程度对国企过度负债的影响以及政府隐性担保的调节作用。研究发现,国有企业混合所有制改革程度越高国企过度负债水平越低,并且相较于股权结构维度,高层治理结构维度的混合所有制改革更有助于缓解国企过度负债;进一步研究发现,政府隐性担保程度的提高抑制了混合所有制改革程度对国企过度负债的缓解作用。本文不仅为混合所有制改革下通过发挥非国有股东的治理作用来缓解国企过度负债提供了经验证据,同时研究结论也表明,混合所有制改革既要股权结构的“混”,更要治理结构的“合”,并且要减少政府隐性担保,充分发挥市场作用。这对有效推进国有企业混合所有制改革有一定的启示意义。

Whether the level of debt of state owned enterprises is reasonable affects whether it can achieve high quality development. The innate characteristics and political relations of the property rights of state owned enterprises make state owned enterprises have the advantage of debt financing,and reduce the financial crisis cost of state owned enterprises,which leads to the high leverage level of state owned enterprises and even shows excessive debt situation. From a macro perspective,the excessive total debt of state owned enterprises will increase the risk of stock price collapse, bring macroeconomic fluctuations and systemic risks of economic and financial;from a micro perspective,the high debt level of state owned enterprises will cause enterprises to fall into financial crisis,and then affect the value added and appreciation of state owned enterprise assets. Therefore,it is of great significance to pay attention to the debt level of state owned enterprises and ease the excessive debt of state owned enterprises. State owned enterprises are an important pillar of China s economy. Its operation is related to the stable operation and high quality development of the entire national economy. Therefore,the reform of state owned enterprises has always been an important part of China s economic reform. Studies have shown that mixed ownership reform and non state owned shareholder governance have positive economic consequences in terms of company performance, corporate efficiency, corporate governance,etc.,which provides good ideas and empirical evidence for improving and promoting mixed ownership reform. The problem of debt is rooted in the defects of the ownership of state owned property rights and the soft constraints of the budget. Then,can the reform of state owned enterprise mixed ownership be played by the role of non state shareholders to relieve excessive debt of state owned enterprises? At the same time,state owned enterprises have government implicit guarantee by virtue of the state owned property rights. Will the impact of mixed ownership reform on the excessive debt of state owned enterprises be different due to the different levels of government implicit guarantee? In order to solve the above problems,this paper manually collects the data of the holdings and delegating personnel of the top ten shareholders of non state owned shareholder disclosed in the 2013 - 2017 Shanghai Shenzhen A share State owned listed company s annual report,from the two dimensions of equity structure and high level governance structure. We will measure the degree of mixed ownership reform of state owned enterprises and study whether the mixed ownership reform of state owned enterprises can alleviate the excessive debt of state owned enterprises and the regulatory role of government implicit guarantee. The study found that the higher the degree of reform of state owned enterprise mixed ownership,the lower the level of excessive debt of state owned enterprises,and the mixed ownership reform of the higher level governance structure dimension is more helpful to alleviate the excessive debt of state owned enterprises. The increase in the degree of government implicit guarantee has inhibited the mitigation of the excessive ownership of state owned enterprises by the mixed ownership reform of state owned enterprises. The possible research contributions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,this paper measures the degree of mixed ownership reform from the two dimensions of equity structure and high level governance structure,,which is helpful to obtain relatively rich and steady conclusions. Secondly,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of mixed ownership reform on the excessive debt of state owned enterprises and the regulatory role of government implicit guarantee. It provides empirical evidence for alleviating excessive debt of state owned enterprises by exerting the governance role of non state owned shareholders under the reform of mixed ownership, enriching mixed ownership studies. The reform and the economic consequences of the governance of non state owned shareholders are also instructive for the improvement of mixed ownership in the reform of state owned enterprises.