论我国反垄断法之宽恕待遇的完善

On the Improvement of Lenient Treatment in China’s Anti-monopoly Law

竞争和垄断相辅相生,竞争使价格趋近成本,经营者可图之利润变薄。为停止或暂缓彼此间的竞争,经营者倾向于用隐蔽的方式达成垄断协议,这严重损害了正常的市场交易和竞争。为解决垄断协议的隐蔽性导致执法机构取证难这一问题,宽恕制度应运而生。但由于我国现行法律对宽恕制度的规定过于原则和概括,且先前多层次的反垄断执法及各规章适用上的差异,尤其是宽恕待遇的设置不合理和不统一,极大地影响了宽恕制度发挥作用。宽恕制度的有效实施,依赖于宽恕制度本身的合理性。因此,若要不断地完善宽恕制度,须设定合理的宽恕待遇,以期更好地发挥宽恕制度在反垄断法实施中的重要作用。

Competition brings prices closer to costs and reduces managers' profits.In order to stop or postpone competition,operators tend to reach monopoly agreements in a covert way,which seriously damages normal market transactions and competition.The concealment of monopoly agreements makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to obtain evidence.To solve this problem,the leniency program came into being.However,the Anti-monopoly law about the leniency program is so principled and generalized,and due to the conflict between the multilevel anti-monopoly law enforcement and the application of various rules,especially the irrational and inconsistent setting of the lenient treatment,greatly damage to the leniency program.The effective implementation of the leniency program depends on the rationality of the leniency program.Therefore,it is necessary to constantly improve the leniency program and set reasonable lenient treatment in order to better play an important role of the leniency program in the implementation of anti-monopoly law.