20世纪60年代前期美台“秘密外交”管道一窥

A Glimpse of Back-Channel Diplomacy between the United States and Taiwan during the Cold War

20世纪60年代的前半期,美国与台湾当局在国民党残军撤离金三角地区、美国同蒙古人民共和国关系正常化、联合国“中国代表权”问题、台湾当局反攻大陆等一系列问题上发生了严重的政策分歧。在正常交涉陷入僵局的情况下,美国中央情报局台北站负责人雷·克莱恩频频充当秘密协调双方政策的中间人。“邦迪—克莱恩—蒋经国”之间的联系,成为肯尼迪与蒋介石沟通的幕后管道,使得美台双方在关系紧张的危机时刻得以绕开官僚体制的障碍,在首脑之间形成直接、有效的沟通。这一“秘密外交”渠道的形成既体现了蒋介石对“外交”的高度专权,喜欢绕开“外交部门”,指派私人使者进行交涉的风格,也体现了美台之间在冷战格局下要将深刻的矛盾隐藏不露的无奈。

In the first half of the 1960s,U.S.-Taiwan relations were strained by considerable policy differences. The Kennedy administration and the Chiang Kai-shek regime diverged over various issues,such as the withdrawal of Kuomintang irregulars from the tri-border area of Thailand,Laos,and Myanmar,the normalization of relations between the United States and the Mongolian People s Republic,China s representation in the United Nations,and the Chinese Nationalists “Mainland Recovery” efforts. When a stalemate arose during conventional diplomatic negotiations between Taiwan and the U.S.,Ray S. Cline,head of the CIA branch in Taipei,emerged as a secret liaison between Chiang Kai-shek and President John F. Kennedy. During the particularly intense moments between the two sides,the secret “Bundy-Cline-Chiang Ching-kuo” communication channel served as an indispensable link between Kennedy and Chiang Kai-shek,thus enabling a small number of decision-makers to bypass bureaucratic obstacles and facilitate direct communication between top officials on both sides. The use of this secret diplomatic channel not only reflected Chiang Kai-shek s highly authoritative approach to foreign policy-making,but also embodied Taiwan s ongoing push to attract as much attention as possible from its most powerful allies in order to advance its diplomatic agenda during the Cold War.