论中小股东在公开征集投票权中的救济

On the Remedies of Minority Shareholders in the Public Solicitation of Voting Rights

传统的委托代理契约是由委托人设计并承担缔约成本,委托人利用正向设计的协议来解决委托人和代理人之间存在的利益冲突和信息不对称问题。而公开征集投票权是一种反向设计的委托代理契约,被征集人无法利用设计契约的权利来解决利益冲突和信息不对称问题,还可能加剧与中小股东之间的利益冲突和信息不对称,造成中小股东权益受损。而这种损害通常会以侵权或违约形式表现出来,因而明确侵权和违约的责任类型,是对中小股东救济的基础。基于此,应建立顺畅的中小股东救济通道,在借鉴美国股东救济经验的基础上,为中小股东建立司法和行政双层救济体系。司法救济包括,在投票权行使之前,被征集人可向法院申请行为保全,在投票权行使之后,可向法院提起公司决议瑕疵之诉和追究征集人的侵权责任或者违约责任。中小股东的行政救济是指在被征集人遇到虚假陈诉、征集欺诈等维权困境时,可以请求有关部门介入调查,保护中小股东的合法权益。

The traditional principal-agent contract is designed by the principal and bears the contracting cost. The principal uses the forward-designed agreement to solve the problems of interest conflict and information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. The public solicitation of voting rights is a reverse design of the principalagent contract. The solicitation can not use the right of the design contract to solve the problem of interest conflict and information asymmetry,which may aggravate the interest conflict and information asymmetry between the solicitation and the minority shareholders,resulting in the minority shareholders ’ rights damage. This kind of damage is usually manifested in the form of infringement or breach of contract.Hence,clarifying the types of liability for infringement and breach of contract is the basis of relief for minority shareholders. Based on this,it is necessary to establish a smooth relief channel for small and medium-sized shareholders,and establish a judicial and admini.