摘要
构建创新型企业、模仿型企业和政府三方非对称进化博弈模型;借助复制动态方程对该博弈系统进行进化稳定性分析;结合三方进化速度中的具体变量总结出四条提升路径即推动创新型企业自主研发,引导实力较强的模仿型企业摆脱模仿转型研发,辅助实力较弱的模仿型企业先通过正规途径引进技术积攒实力以备自主研发,提高政府激励政策和监管措施落实的积极性;以变量的影响因素为基础,结合提升路径分别对博弈三方提出针对性建议。
Firstly,an asymmetric evolution game model of innovative enterprise,imitation enterprise and government was constructed. Secondly,the evolutionary stability of the game system was analyzed by means of replication dynamic equation. Then,combined with the specific variables in the evolution speed of the three parties,four paths of improvement were summarized,namely,promoting innovative enterprises to conduct independent R&D,guiding the stronger imitation enterprises to get rid of imitation and transform to R&D,assisting the weaker imitation enterprises to first introduce technology through the regular channels to accumulate strength and prepare for independent R&D,and improving the government’s initiative of implementing incentive policies and regulatory measures;finally,based on the influencing factors of the variables,the authors put forward some suggestions to the three parties of the game.
作者
赵凯莉
王建中
ZHAO Kai-li;WANG Jian-zhong(Business College,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650000,China)
出处
《科技与经济》
2019年第4期36-40,共5页
Science & Technology and Economy
关键词
自主研发
模仿
政府监管
激励引导
三方进化博弈
independent R&D
imitation
government regulation
incentive and guidance
tripartite evolutionary game