风险厌恶零售商促销和定价下供应链的协调

Supply chain coordination with a risk-averse retailer exerting promotion and pricing decision

为了探讨风险厌恶、促销和定价三种因素对供应链契约协调性的联合影响,构建了零售商促销且定价下基于回购和成本分担机制的博弈模型,其中供应链由风险中性的供应商和风险厌恶的零售商组建,零售商的风险厌恶使用CVaR方法进行测度,结果表明回购和成本分担机制不能协调供应链.尽管如此,通过引入固定转移支付(FTP)或限制转售价格(RPM)机制,不仅能实现对供应链的协调,还能完成供应链收益在成员企业之间的任意分配.在FTP机制下,分析了契约参数与零售商风险厌恶的关系;在RPM机制下,讨论了供应商如何实施价格管制政策;并对两个机制协调供应链的机理以及零售商的风险厌恶对契约参数的影响进行了比较分析.最后实施数值仿真以验证结论.

To explore joint impact of the three factors including risk aversion, promotion and pricing on contracts coordination of a supply chain, this paper builds a game model of the supply chain composed of a risk neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. The retailer exerts promotion effort and pricing decision, which affects the market demand of commodities. The retailer’s risk aversion is measured by the CVaR method. In particular, the channel member firms uses buy-back contracts combined with cost sharing mechanism to coordinate the supply chain. It results to shows that coordination of the supply chain cannot be realized. However, by introduction of fixed transfer payment (FTP) or resale price maintenance (RPM) mechanism, it can not only succeed in achieving the supply chain coordination, but also achieve arbitrary distribution of the supply chain revenue between the member firms. In the case of FTP, it investigates relationships between the parameters of contracts and the retailer’s risk aversion coefficient. In the case of RPM, it analyzes how the supplier implements price control policies. Furthermore, a comparative analysis is made on coordination mechanism and impact of the retailer’s risk aversion on the contract parameters between in FTP with in RPM. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out to verify the conclusions.