第三方回收商公平关切下闭环供应链决策模型

Decision-making model of closed-loop supply chain based on third-party collector’s fairness concern

公平关切是较常见的一种有限理性行为是指企业在主观上具有一定的公平倾向性和行为动机.为了探究第三方回收商(以下简称回收商)的公平关切行为,构建了一个包含制造商、零售商、消费者和回收商的闭环供应链动态博弈模型,其中回收商具有公平关切行为,制造商和零售商均为完全理性企业.分析了回收商无公平关切行为情形、制造商分别考虑和不考虑回收商的公平关切行为情形的三个决策模型.研究表明,回收商的公平关切行为对闭环供应链不利,它降低了回收率和制造商与回收商的效用;当制造商考虑回收商的公平关切行为时,制造商和回收商的效用均高于制造商不考虑公平关切时的效用;当回收商存在公平关切行为时,公平关切程度高低和制造商是否考虑回收商的公平关切同时影响回收率的大小.最后,运用算例进一步验证了理论模型的有效性和正确性.

Fairness concern is a limited rationality behavior, which means that enterprises have fair tendentiousness and behavioral motivation. A closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), consisting of the manufacturer, the retailer, the consumers and the third-party collector, is developed to discuss the fairness concern of third-party collectors. The third-party collector is assumed to have fairness concern and the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to be completely rational. The results of three different scenarios: The third-party collector is neutral, the manufacturer considers the third-party collector’s fairness concern, and the manufacturer does not consider the third-party collector’s fairness concern, show that the third-party collector’s fairness concern adversely affects the CLSC, since the recovery rate and the utilities of both the manufacturer and the third-party collector are reduced. When the manufacturer considers the third-party collector’s fairness concern, the utilities of the manufacturer and the third-party collector are higher than when the manufacturer does not. When the third-party collector exerts fairness concern behaviors, the recovery rate is affected by the degree of the thirdparty collector’s fairness concern and whether the manufacturer considers the third-party collector’s fairness concern. Finally, the validity and correctness of the theoretical model are analyzed by a numerical example.