政府规制下的第三方废旧手机回收演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Third-party’ Recycling of Waste Mobile Phone under Government Regulation

为研究废旧手机回收的政府决策问题,构建政府与第三方回收商行为决策的演化博弈模型,并对模型的稳定性进行了分析,在此基础上研究了政府对第三方回收商回收行为的动态惩罚和补偿策略,分析了政府与第三方回收商回收策略的互动机制.结果表明:政府对第三方回收商回收行为选择的相对应的回收策略的奖惩程度、第三方回收商选择的回收策略的成本与收益均直接影响演化博弈结果;当政府对第三方回收商选择相对应的动态惩罚或补偿策略时,演化博弈存在稳定Nash均衡点.

In order to study decision-making of old and waste mobile phone recycling,this paper builds the evolutionary game model between government and the third-party recyclers’ behavioral decision,analyzes stability of the model,establishes government’s dynamic punishment and compensation strategy to the third-party recyclers on such basis,and anar lyzes the interactive mechanism among government and the third-party recyclers’ recycling strategy.The analysis shows that the results of evolutionary game are directly influenced by government’s rewards and penalties to the third-party recyclers’ recycling behavior and costs and benefits of recycling strategies adopted by the third-party recyclers;and there exits a stable Nash equilibrium point in the evolutionary game model when government applies corresponding dynamic penalties or compensation to the third-party recyclers.