预售模式下资金约束供应链协调机制研究

Coordination Mechanism for a Capital Constrained Supply Chain Under Advance Selling

为研究预售模式对资金约束供应链运作的影响,探讨实现供应链协调的契约机制,本文以1个供应商和1个资金短缺零售商组成的二层供应链为研究对象,构建Stackelberg博弈模型,分析零售商未采用预售模式和采用预售模式两种情形下,分散式供应链和集中式供应链的产品定价策略,并基于收益共享契约设计相应的供应链协调机制。研究表明,预售模式下资金约束供应链的产品最优销售价格和产品最优批发价格受到预售知情消费者比例和潜在需求增长量的影响;收益共享比例系数满足一定条件时,收益共享契约可以有效协调供应链。

In order to investigate the impact on capital constrained supply chain caused by advance selling,and to explore coordination mechanism for the supply chain,by taking a two-echelon supply chain composed of a supplier and a capital constrained retailer as the research object,Stackelberg game model is constructed,decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain’s pricing strategy with or without advance selling is analyzed,and coordination mechanism for the supply chain based on revenue-sharing contract is designed.The study shows that the capital constrained supply chain’s optimal wholesale price and sale price with advance selling strategy are affected by the proportion of informed customers and the increment of potential demand,and when the revenue-sharing ratio meets certain conditions,the revenue-sharing contract could coordinate the supply chain.