大股东股权质押与审计师选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Stock Rights Pledging of Blockholders and Auditor Choice ——Evidence from China

大股东股权质押后倾向于从事应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理等机会主义行为来维稳股价,缓解控制权转移风险,因而大股东股权质押可能会影响审计师选择行为。本文以我国2007-2015年A股上市公司为样本,研究大股东股权质押与审计师选择之间的关系,结果显示:(1)大股东股权质押后更可能选择低质量的审计师,从而规避高质量的外部监督,缓解控制权转移风险。(2)这种关系只存在于民营企业中,在国有企业中这种关系不存在。(3)市场化环境在大股东股权质押与审计师选择之间发挥着调节作用,在市场化程度高的地区,大股东股权质押后选择低质量审计师的动机更强。(4)大股东股权质押的公司在选择非"四大"后进行了更多的应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理。本文提出了公司代理问题与审计师选择、股权质押经济后果以及审计师选择影响因素的相关对策。

Blockholders who pledge stock rights tend to engage in opportunistic behavior such as accrued earnings management and real earnings management to stabilize the stock price and alleviate the risk of losing control rights. Therefore, stock rights pledging of blockholders may affect the auditor choice behavior. This paper investigates the relationship between stock rights pledging of blockholders and auditor choice based on A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015. We find that blockholders who pledge stock rights is more likely to choose a low-quality auditor to avoid high-quality external supervision and ease the risk of losing control rights. However, this relationship only exists in private enterprises. Marketization also plays a mediation role. In regions with high degree of marketization, the motivation for selecting low-quality auditor after pledging stock is stronger. A further study found that companies with stock rights pledging of blockholders have conducted more accrued earnings management and real earnings management after selecting non-big4, thus they have achieved the goal of avoiding high-quality supervision. This paper puts forward suggestions that are related to agency problem and auditor choice, the economic consequences of stock rights pledge and the determinants of auditor choice.