混合所有制发展、董事会有效性与企业绩效

Mixed Ownership,Effectiveness of the Board of Directors and Corporate Performance

本文基于中国有企业业混合所有制的改革和发展,运用固定效应面板模型,选取中国2014—2017年A股上市公司数据,考察不同控股性质、不同时间节点的混合所有制企业发展对董事会有效性和公司绩效的不同影响,以及董事会有效性在各类控股性质混合所有制企业中的不同作用。从混合所有制本质以及中小投资者保护角度,使用股权集中度和股权制衡度来衡量混合所有制效果。董事会有效性使用董事会行为指数(CCBI_BBBNU)来衡量,以反映董事会是否实质性发挥作用,这区别于既有研究大都满足于对董事会形式上或结构上的衡量。研究结果表明:(1)股权集中度当期效应对董事会有效性呈负相关关系,与企业绩效呈倒U型关系;董事会有效性在当期股权集中度与企业绩效之间起到了部分中介作用。(2)股权制衡度当期效应对董事会有效性并无显著影响,对企业绩效之间的关系集中在U型关系的后半段;股权制衡度滞后效应与董事会有效性之间呈倒U型关系,与企业绩效呈倒U型关系,董事会有效性对二者关系的影响并不明显。(3)进一步研究发现,在国有控股公司中,董事会有效性对股权制衡度与企业绩效间的关系有显著的中介作用,相对于非国有控股公司,国有控股公司董事会行为是否有效更取决于股权制衡水平而非股权集中度,国有企业混合所有制改革中追求绝对控制力不利于企业发展。据此分析结果,本文对混合所有制发展以及董事会有效性机制的完善提出相应的政策建议。

Based on the reform and development of mixed ownership of Chinese enterprises,using the fixed-effect panel data and the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2017,this paper investigates the different effects of mixed ownership on effectiveness of the board of directors and the performance of companies with varied controlling shareholders and time nodes,as well as the differences of effectiveness of the board of directors in mixed ownership enterprises with different controlling shareholders.Mixed ownership can be measured by equity concentration and equity check-and-balance.The effectiveness of the board of directors is measured by the board behavior index (CCBI_BB BNU ),which is developed by the authors,to reflect whether the board of directors plays a substantive role,different from the existing studies which mostly satisfy the formal or structural measurement of the board of directors. The results are shown as follows.Firstly,the current effect of equity concentration has a negative correlation with effectiveness of the board of directors,and has an inverted U-type relationship with the company performance;effectiveness of the board of directors plays a part of the intermediary role in the relationship between current ownership concentration and corporate performance.Secondly,the current effect of equity check-and-balance has no significant impact on effectiveness of the board of directors,and the relationship between corporate performance is concentrated in the second half of the positive U-shaped relationship;the lag effect of equity check-and-balance and effectiveness of the board of directors shows an inverted U-shaped relationship;the lag effect of equity check-and-balance and corporate performance shows an inverted U-shaped relationship,and the effect of effectiveness of the board of directors on the relationship is not obvious.Thirdly,further research shows that in state holding companies,effectiveness of the board of directors has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between equity check-and-balance and corporate performance;compared with non-state holding companies,effectiveness of the board of directors of state holding companies depends more on the level of equity check-and-balance than that of equity concentration,and the pursuit of absolute control in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is not conducive to the development of enterprises. Therefore,this paper proposes corresponding policy recommendations for the development of mixed ownership and the improvement of effectiveness of the board of directors.