基于演化博弈模型的反洗钱监管有效性问题研究

Research on the Effectiveness of Anti-money Laundering Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Model

反洗钱义务机构与监管机构之间存在天然的博弈关系,双方在博弈中动态演化、选择对应策略。本文通过演化博弈模型分析探索提高反洗钱监管有效性的途径,提出在非稳态均衡状态下,常态化监管促进稳健履职;在均衡状态下,以成本收益分析为纲双路径推动高效监管;在固定成本状态下,通过优化配置监管资源助力高效履职等监管建议。

There is a natural game relationship between anti-money laundering institutions and regulatory agencies. The two sides dynamically evolve and choose corresponding strategies in the game. This paper explores ways to improve the effectiveness of anti-money laundering supervision through evolutionary game model analysis.Promote steady performance with normalized regulation under unsteady-state equilibrium, promote efficient supervision through dual paths under the equilibrium state with cost-benefit analysis and optimize the configuration of regulatory resources to help efficient performance under fixed cost.