自然类语词的意义:一种新洛克主义进路

The meaning of natural kind terms:A neo-Lockean approach

关于自然类语词如何指称对象并获得其意义的问题,存在两种主要观点。传统的洛克式理论认为自然类语词的意义就是与其相联系的描述语或名义本质,满足名义本质的任何事物就是自然类语词的指称物。在批评传统理论的基础上,克里普克和普特南提出的新指称理论主张自然类语词不是借助与其相联系的名义本质为中介来指称自然类而是直接指称自然类,并且其指称物是由真实本质所决定。但是,新指称理论所确立的自然类本质主义在当代科学分类实践中面临严重困挫。基于此,采用自然类语词的一种新洛克主义解释,也即自然类语词仍然通过与其相联系的名义本质来决定其指称物,但是这种名义本质在某些方面不同于传统洛克式名义本质,这样可以避免传统理论和新指称理论所遭遇的一些困难。

There are mainly two views on how natural kind terms refer to and acquire their meaning. The traditional Lockean theory holds that the meaning of natural kind terms is just descriptions or nominal essence associated with them,and anything satisfying the nominal essence is the referent of natural kind terms. By criticizing the traditional theory,the new theory of reference proposed by Kripke and Putnam claims that natural kind terms directly refer to natural kinds rather than using nominal essence associated with them as mediation,and the referents of natural kind terms are determined by real essence. However,natural kind essentialism established by the new theory of reference faces serious difficulties in contemporary scientific classification practices. Based on this,this paper attempts to employ a neo-Lockean account of natural kind terms,according to which the referents of natural kind terms are still determined by nominal essence associated with natural kind terms. But this kind of nominal essence is in some respect distinguished from the traditional Lockean nominal essence so that the neo-Lockean account of natural kind terms could avoid some difficulties met by traditional theory and new theory of reference.