政府管制费率约束下工伤保险待遇的安全效应研究

Research on the Safety Effect of Workers’ Compensation Based on the Constraint of Government Regulation Rate

基于管制经济学理论的变迁及内在逻辑,在阶段性降低保险费率和工伤保险结构性改革背景下,本文采用中国省级行业及地区面板数据,通过构建综合工伤保险费率指标,使用门槛模型评估了工伤保险待遇对于降低工伤事故率而取得的安全效应。研究发现,政府实施低管制费率时,提高工伤保险待遇会显著降低工伤伤害率,而当管制费率超过一定值时,安全激励系数不再显著,甚至出现负面效应。进一步分析安全效应低的内在作用机理发现,企业道德风险的存在限制了工伤保险待遇的预防作用发挥,事前名义道德风险不仅无法消除事后真实道德风险,反而加剧了企业道德风险程度。据此,政府应充分利用政府管制费率降低的契机,朝着创新驱动的工伤预防管制模式转变,才能实现劳动者安全效应最大化,促进企业健康持续发展。

Facing the current severe work-related injury situation and the limited payment capacity of enterprises,Chinese government has implemented the policy of lower the premium rate for work-related injury insurance periodically to help enterprises reduce production costs and increase their motivation to protect workers safety from 2015 to 2019.Whether the measure will come into being the lower workers safety effect in exchange for the short-term economic effect of the enterprise,or the higher enterprises economic effect and the higher workers safety effect at the same time?Therefore,the paper studies the relationship among the regulated rate,the workers compensation and the safety effect. Theoretically,based on the development and internal logic of the regulatory economics theory and the incentive mechanism of work-related injury prevention,the paper establishes the Lagrange function of maximizing the total benefits of enterprise and worker.We find that if the government sets proper incentive mechanism,it corrects the asymmetric information between the enterprise and worker,which protecting the injured workers safety rights.At the same time,the enterprise adjusts the work-related risk degree to minimize the expected cost of avoiding accidents.However,the government implements inappropriate regulation intensity and makes enterprises dissatisfied with work-related injury prevention regulation,which leading to government failure and increasing the enterprises economic burden,finally easily leading to enterprise moral hazard. Empirically,the paper constructs the comprehensive rate index through the insurance premium rates of different industries and evaluates the the safety effect of workers compensation on the enterprise injury accident rate,which using the panel threshold model with a sample of the China provincial industry and regional data.We find that the government implements weak regulation and high-welfare workers compensation will significantly reduce the work-related injury rate.However,when the regulated rate exceeds a certain value,the safety incentive coefficient is no longer significant or even negative safety effect.Further,the paper analyzes the intrinsic mechanism of low security effect and finds the enterprise moral hazard limit the safety effect of workers compensation.The nominal moral hazard cannot eliminate the real moral hazard after the event and aggravates the enterprise moral hazard degree. The results of the paper show that the government should make full use of the opportunity that enterprises can obtain short-term benefits to realize the transformation of innovation-driven work-related injury prevention regulation mode,which maximize the safety effect and promoting the healthy and sustainable development of enterprise.