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论破产重整中战略投资人的权益保护 被引量:3

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摘要 破产重整制度已在我国的破产理论和实务中得到普遍的接受.相较于耗时较长、收益较低的破产清算制度,破产重整制度有着无可替代的优势.在破产实务中,当企业处于濒临破产的边缘或已经破产时,须做出是通过重整重生还是通过清算消灭的选择,若企业的利益相关人选择重整,则须在选择重整制度的基础上进一步选择重整的模式.在司法层面,纵观我国整部《企业破产法》,似乎战略投资人与破产重整没有半点关系.在破产制度中得到《企业破产法》确定的主体只有债务人、出资人、债权人、管理人、法院等主体,战略投资人在重整制度的篇章中也没有出现.这种将重整融资完全托付给市场调节、甚至对融资后权利义务的变动都不加以规则的立法思路值得商榷.
作者 周长
机构地区 贵州大学
出处 《中国集体经济》 2019年第26期108-109,共2页 China Collective Economy
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