本质直观:胡塞尔与石里克之争再议

Essential Intuition: The Dispute Between Husserl and Schlick Reconsidered

胡塞尔认为对经验命题中的形式性含义与普遍命题的充实,都需要本质直观。在作此论证的过程中,他反对了传统的经验论和理念实在论。他承认作为抽象对象的本质,但限定其解决方案不预设任何形而上学实体化含义。石里克没有直接考察胡塞尔本质直观的充实论证,而是直接攻击其本质直观概念本身。石里克没有充分认识到,在关于心理活动和逻辑之物(概念和其它逻辑结构等)的关系的理论上,胡塞尔实际上和他有共同的论敌,即心理主义和柏拉图式的形而上学观念实在论。但在很大程度上,胡塞尔和石里克都没看到对方与自己关于概念、知识的理论的真正不同之处,错失了在与对方理论进行真正的对话中辩护与澄清自身理论的可能性。

According to Husserl's view,the fulfillment of formal meanings in empirical propositions and universal propositions requires essential intuition.Husserl has defended this view against traditional empiricism and idealistic realism.He accepts essence as abstract object,though his solution does not include any metaphysically postulated entities.Schlick did not consider Husserl's argument from fulfillment for essential intuition,but attacked the concept of essential intuition itself directly.Schlick has not realized,he and Husserl are against the same theories regard to the relation between the psychological and the logical,i.e.,pyschologism and platonic metaphysical realism.Husserl and Schlick did not see the real difference between their own views concerning concept and knowledge,and missed the opportunity for having a real dialogue that could clarify their own views to each other.