国有企业党组织讨论前置决策机制的效应研究——基于博弈论视角

Effects of Party Organization Discussions Upfront Decision-Making in State-owned Enterprises:A Perspective of Game Theory

讨论前置决策程序是我国深化国有企业改革的理论创新和实践要求。国有企业党组织讨论前置改变了传统的公司治理结构的决策规则和程序,构建起国有控股公司党组织、董事会和经理层等治理主体之间的新型决策关系。基于多方治理主体,研究建立讨论前置决策博弈模型,旨在揭示党组织协调董事会与经理层关系的内在机制及其协同效应。研究表明,在党组织讨论前置决策机制下,董事会与经理层更容易合作,协同效应明显。国有企业引入党组织讨论前置决策程序有助于将企业的决策系统与执行系统协同起来,保证企业决策的执行效果。

Discussions upfront decision-making procedure is the theoretical innovation and practical requirement of the CPC Central Committee on deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises. Party organizations discussions upfront decision- making in state-owned enterprises has changed the decision- making rules and procedures of traditional corporate governance structures, and thus established a new decision-making relationship between governance subjects including Party organizations, board of directors, managers and etc. Based on multi-governance subjects, this paper studies and establishes a game model for discussions upfront decision-making, aiming at revealing the internal mechanism and synergistic effect of the coordination between the board of directors and managers. The research shows that under the discussions upfront decision- making mechanism of the Party organizations, the board of directors and the manager are more likely to reach agreement, and the synergy effect is obvious. The introduction of the party organization discussions upfront decision-making procedure into state-owned enterprises is helpful to coordinate the decision-making system with the execution system of the enterprise and ensure the implementation effect of the decision-making of the enterprise.