董秘持股有助于提升信息披露质量吗?——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

Do Company Secretary’s Shareholdings Improve Information Disclosure Quality?——Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

本文以2010-2015年沪深A股主板上市公司为研究样本,对董秘持股与信息披露质量之间的相关关系进行了实证研究。研究发现,相较于董秘未持股的上市公司,董秘持股的上市公司信息披露质量更高,这说明董秘持股有助于提高上市公司信息披露质量。按照产权性质的分组研究表明,民营企业中董秘持股能显著提高信息披露质量;但在国有企业中,这一作用却没能得到充分发挥。进一步研究发现,当董秘同时任公司其他高管职位或具有财务背景时,董秘持股对信息披露质量的改善作用更强。

According to the analysis of the companies with company secretary's shareholdings listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share board from 2010 to 2015, this paper studies the relationship between the company secretary's shareholdings and the information disclosure quality. This study finds that, compared with the listed companies without secretary's shareholdings, the quality of information disclosure of the listed companies that with shares held by secretary is higher, which shows that the shareholdings of secretary contributes to the improvement of information disclosure quality. The further study shows that the company's ownership type has an effect on the relationship between the company secretary's shareholdings and the information disclosure quality. In the listed non-state-owned companies, the company secretary's shareholdings can notably improve the information disclosure quality, while the relationship no longer exists in the listed state-owned companies. Besides, when the company secretary serves as other executives position or when he has related financial background, the company secretary's shareholdings will improve the information disclosure quality more notably.