高管薪酬契约、债务契约与盈余管理

Executive Compensation Contract,Debt Contract and Earnings Management

以风险投资支持公司为研究对象,研究高管薪酬契约、债务契约对于风险投资逐名动机的作用方式。实证研究表明:风险投资持股比例越高,公司在IPO当期的盈余管理程度越高,风险投资具有侵害公司的逐名动机;公司经营绩效水平越高,风险投资刺激公司盈余管理的程度越低,在IPO当期及解锁退出前阶段尤为显著,高管薪酬契约对风险投资影响公司盈余管理发挥约束作用。公司资产负债率越高,风险投资刺激公司盈余管理程度越高,债务契约并不能发挥约束作用,反而增强了风险投资对公司盈余管理的影响。

This paper investigated the impact of executive compensation contract and debt contract on the way which the VC influence the earnings management of company. The empirical research shows that: the higher the proportion of VC shareholding, the higher the degree of earnings management in the IPO,VC has the grandstanding.When the VC-backed company s operating performance level is excelent, the degree of the VC stimulates the company s earnings management reduced, especially in the IPO and before the unlocking and exiting stage.Executive compensation contracts play a binding role in the impact of VC on the earnings management.The higher the company s asset-liability ratio is, the higher the degree of earnings management stimulated by VC will be. Debt contracts do not play a binding role, but enhance the influence of VC on earnings management.