笛卡尔的表征主义问题

On Descartes’ Representationalism

笛卡尔在西方学界长期被奉为表征主义者,但是近年来这个观点不断受到挑战,部分学者尝试通过回溯到经院哲学的双重存在理论,亦或通过意向性理论重新解读笛卡尔的认识论,以反驳其认识论并未构成表征主义。但通过对笛卡尔的认识论的详细梳理,并结合当前相关的观念论解读,可以发现这两种观点都存在不同的问题。本文认为就笛卡尔哲学本身而言,其认识论依然构成一种表征主义。

For a long period,Descartes is regarded as a representationalist in the western academia.However,in the recent researches a number of scholars challenge this viewpoint.Some trace back to the scholastic double-existence theory to re-interpret Descartes epistemology,some try to re-understand it from the perspective of intentionality.They both reject that Descartes epistemology has a form of representationalism.Nevertheless,through a detailed analysis and with some contemporary interpretations of Descartes theory of ideas,it will be clear that the above mentioned two viewpoints do not stand on a stable ground and face some contradictions with Descartes own texts.This article argues that Descartes epistemology has a form of representationalism.