CFO兼任董秘可以提高会计信息质量吗?

Does CFO Serving as a Board Secretary Improve the Quality of Accounting Information?

本文基于信息不对称和代理理论,考察CFO兼任董秘对公司会计信息质量的影响。研究发现,CFO兼任董秘会弱化公司内部监督,使其有更大的空间进行盈余操纵,进而导致公司会计信息质量下降。进一步地,在考虑CFO年龄及审计监督因素后,发现该负向关系在CFO处于40至50岁和外部审计质量差的样本中更为显著。研究结论表明,CFO兼任董秘时会借助兼任带来的职权效应,进行更严重的机会主义行为,因此,投资者在关注CFO兼任董秘进行信息披露时,也应关注公司高管团队内部监督的有效性。本文的研究不仅丰富了高管兼任后果层面的相关文献,也为监管层有效监督高管行为提供参考,具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。

Based on information asymmetry and agency theory,this paper investigates the influence of CFO serving as a board secretary on the quality of accounting information.The study found that CFO serving as a board secretary weakens the internal supervision of the company which reduces the quality of accounting information of listed companies.Further,this negative correlation is more pronounced in the samples of CFO's age between 40 to 50 years old and poor external audit quality.The research conclusions show that CFO can carry out more serious opportunistic behaviors with the help of serving as a board secretary.Therefore,regulators and investors should pay more attention to the self-interested behavior of CFOs while receiving the information disclosed by CFOs.This paper not only enriches the relevant literature on the concurrent aspects of corporate executives,but also provides reference for the regulatory authorities to formulate corresponding regulatory policies.It has important theoretical and practical significance for understanding the economic consequences caused by executives serving as board secretaries.