高管权力、机构投资者与并购绩效

Executive Power, Institutional Investors and M&A Performance

以2010~2016年我国A股市场并购交易样本为研究对象,实证检验了高管权力、机构投资者与并购绩效三者关系,研究表明:(1)高管权力对并购绩效具有负向影响,且在国企样本中负面影响更大。(2)机构投资者通过抑制高管权力对并购绩效负面影响的作用路径来提升主并方的并购绩效,相较于国企样本,该作用路径在非国企组中更明显。(3)相较同地并购,机构投资者在异地并购中对高管权力与并购绩效的调节作用更显著;相较中央国企,机构投资者在发起方为地方国企样本中调节作用更显著。研究结论为合理限制高管权力以及国有企业积极引入机构投资者实施混合所有制改革的必要性提供了依据。

This paper examines the relationship between executive power, institutional investors and M & A performance by taking 1879 samples of M & A transactions in China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016. The research results are as follows:(1)Executive power has a significant negative impacton M&A performance.which is more conspicuousin state-owned enterprises.(2)Institutional investors’ shareholdings have a positive impact on M&A performance. The role of institutional investors is to suppress the negative impact of executive power on M&A performance. This inhibition effect is weak in the samples of SOEs, but prominent in the samples of non-state enterprises especially when the institutional investors have a certain proportion of shares.(3)Further research based on the type of mergers and acquisitions finds that institutional investors have more significant effects on the regulation of executive power and M&A performance in off-site mergers and acquisitions;When the party concerned is a central state-owned enterprise, the adjustment effect is more significant, and the regulatory role of institutional investors in non-state-owned enterprises is not significantly different. The conclusions of the study provide a basis for rationally restricting the power of executives and highlight the need for state-owned enterprises to actively introduce institutional investors to implement the mixed ownership reform.