海德格尔的“基础存在论”是“哲学人类学”吗?—论达沃斯论辩中卡西尔对海德格尔“康德解释”的一个责难

Is Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology A Philosophical Anthropology?——On a Cassirer’s Charge against Heidegger’s Kant’s Interpretation in Davos

在著名的达沃斯论辩中,卡西尔对海德格尔的“康德解释”以及与之相关的“基础存在论”有一将之视为哲学人类学和相对主义的“责难”。通过对达沃斯论辩中一处文本的具体分析,可以发现,海德格尔在这里为自己辩护的策略是要撇清,《存在与时间》关于人的亲在的生存论分析,作为新时代的形上学的疑难发问,非但在本质上不是什么哲学人类学,相反,它是可能跳出并克服传统哲学人类学,进入对存在本身进行疑难发问的真正尝试。相形之下,卡西尔对海德格尔康德解释的批评,以及沿循新康德主义的康德知识论解释,反倒是自陷在哲学人类学的存在者层面上,不能真正进入康德哲学发问形而上学疑难和为形而上学奠基的核心要义。

In the well-known Davos debate,Cassirer charges against Heidegger in saying that Heidegger’s“Kant’s Interpretation”and his“fundamental ontology”belong still to philosophical anthropology and relativism.The present essay attempts to explain and to argue,through a detailed textual reading and analysis of a key paragraph in the“records of the debate,”that Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein should be seen as a re-opening of the metaphysical problematic in our contemporary age.It does not essentially belong to any kind of philosophical anthropology.Rather,it opens,by the way of asking the problem or the question of Being itself,a real possibility of going beyond and overcoming all the traditional philosophical anthropologies.In contrast,Cassirer’s criticism against Heidegger’s ontological Kant’s interpretation and his following the Neo-Kantian epistemological way of interpretation of Kant,make himself still staying on an ontic level of philosophical thinking and thus finally falling back into a trap of philosophical anthropology.Because of this,Heidegger concludes that Cassirer cannot catch and understand the real significance of Kant’s questioning of the metaphysical problem and of his laying the very ground for the real metaphysics of Being.