股权质押与会计稳健性

Stock Pledge and the Accounting Conservatism

本文采用我国沪深两市A股上市公司2009-2016年的数据检验了股权质押和会计稳健性的关系。研究发现,存在股权质押的上市公司会计稳健性会降低,股权质押与会计稳健性的负相关关系在非国有企业与经营业绩较差的企业中更显著。研究结果表明,在股权质押后上市公司会通过提前释放"好消息"和隐藏"坏消息"的方式进行市值管理。本文认为财务报告使用者应该重视股权质押后上市公司会计信息质量下降的风险,同时监管机构应做好应对股权质押带来的系统性金融风险的防范工作。

This paper uses the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2016 to test the relationship between stock pledge and accounting conservatism.The empirical results show that the accounting conservatism of listed companies with stock pledge will decrease,and the negative relationship between stock pledge and accounting conservatism is stronger in non-state-owned companies and companies with poor business performance. The research results show that after the stock pledge,the listed company will manage their market value by releasing "good news" and hiding "bad news".This paper argues that users of financial reports should pay attention to the information risk after stock pledge,and the regulators should prevent systemic financial risks brought about by stock pledge in advance.