美德足以成就幸福吗?——柏拉图《法律》中的幸福观探微

Is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness? ——A New Study on Plato’s Conception of Happiness in Laws

美德作为西方古典政治哲学的一个核心概念,被普遍认为是最高善和至高目的——“幸福”所不可或缺的成分。然而,柏拉图在后期对话录中究竟坚持美德是幸福的主要成分还是唯一要素,这在西方古典幸福论研究传统中颇有争议。亚里士多德及古希腊悲剧的现代研究者基本上都不认同“美德的充分性”论点,而是强调运气等外在因素对幸福的实质性影响。不同于以往片面否定柏拉图在晚年仍坚持“美德足以成就幸福”的做法,本文结合学界最新的研究成果,试图从《法律》这一目前受关注较少的晚期文本出发,论证《法律》其实提供了一个丰富而复杂的“充分性论点”,而且这一论点与一系列直觉上可信的、对自身构成明显威胁的要求与主张并不矛盾;在此基础上,尝试提出一种把“对某些外在物的需求与快乐是幸福的必需之物”与“美德是幸福的充分条件”这一对看似矛盾的观点统一起来的可行思路。

As a core concept of western classical political philosophy,virtue is generally regarded as an indispensable component of the supreme good and supreme“happiness”. However,Plato s insistence on whether it is the main ingredient or the only element of happiness in his later dialogues is controversial in the classical tradition of the study of happiness. Aristotle and modern researchers of ancient Greek tragedy generally do not agree with the argument of “the sufficiency of virtue”. They repeatedly criticize Plato for exaggerating its role in the promotion of virtue and emphasize the substantial influence of external factors such as luck on happiness. Different from previous partial negation Plato in his later years still adhere to the practice of “virtue is sufficient for happiness”,combining with the latest research achievements of academic circles, this paper tries to start from the Laws which has less attention at present to demonstrate that the Laws actually provides a rich and complex “sufficiency thesis”, and this argument does not contradict a series of intuitively credible demands and claims that pose a clear threat to themselves.Under this premise,an attempt will be made to come up with a solution that reconciles the need for some external object with the idea that happiness is necessary for happiness,and the seemingly contradictory idea that virtue is a sufficient condition for happiness.