新能源汽车产业政府补贴与企业行为——基于动态博弈视角

Government Subsidies and Corporate Behavior in the New Energy Automobile Industry——Based on Dynamic Game Perspective

通过构建政府补贴与企业行为的动态博弈模型,分析影响政府补贴有效性的因素及实践中出现企业骗补问题的原因所在,并利用新能源汽车上市企业2010—2017年的面板数据对政府补贴有效性的影响因素进行计量分析,结果表明:总体而言,政府补贴政策对新能源汽车企业的研发投入行为具有显著的正向促进作用,新能源汽车企业新产品的市场需求以及政府对骗补企业的惩罚力度是影响政府补贴有效性的重要因素。由此,文章也得出一些有价值的政策建议。

By constructing a dynamic game model of government subsidies and corporate behavior, the paper analyzes the factors that affect the effectiveness of government subsidies and the reasons why enterprises cheat and make up problems in practice. Using the panel data of listed new energy vehicle companies in 2010-2017, we make a metrological analysis to measure the factors affecting the effectiveness of government subsidies. The results show that in general, the government subsidy policy has a significant positive effect on the R&D investment behavior of new energy automotive enterprises. The market demand of new products of new energy automotive enterprises and the government’s punishment for fraudulent enterprises are important factors that affect the effectiveness of government subsidies. From this, we also propose some valuable policy recommendations.