摘要
2019年3月1日,上海证券交易所《科创板股票上市规则》接受采用不同投票权资本架构的公司在科创板申请上市。通过从不同投票权资本架构和公司治理模式在美国证券资本市场从被禁止到被接受的历史进程和理论争议出发,探讨上市公司实行不同投票权的利弊及在中国科创板适用时的制度完善和投资者保护问题。不同投票权是由“资本雇佣劳动”到“劳动雇佣资本”的时代进程的外部表征。
On March 1, 2019, the“Science Board Listing Rule” of Shanghai Stock Exchange began to accept differentiated voting structure. This paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of differentiated voting structure in listed companies' corporate governance, the system perfection and investor protection when applied in the technology innovation board in China, and the historical development of its application in the US stock markets. Differentiated voting structure is an external representation of the process from “capital hires labor” to “labor hires capital”.
作者
郭丹
GUO Dan(School of Law,Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 210029,China)
出处
《哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第5期135-140,共6页
Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
不同投票权
差异化表决权
资本市场
公司治理
投资者保护
differentiated voting rights
dual class share structures
capital markets
corporate governance
investors protection