中国式财政分权、群组效应与经济增长

Chinese Fiscal Decentralization,Group Effect and Economic Growth

空间交互策略分析框架下的中国式财政分权对地区经济增长产生何种影响?本文从政府间的财政竞争角度,通过建立空间杜宾模型和多水平模型,从纵、横向竞争两个方面分别检验了232个地级市的财政收入策略互动特征对经济增长率的影响效应。通过研究发现:中国式分税制不存在类似联邦财政体制的纵向竞争,为促进辖区经济增长,纵向财政关系更多地表现为表面妥协和制度创新;而横向竞争关系则存在群组效应,地方政府为实现经济增长刻意降低税收征管效率,同一区域内的地级市政府偏好于采用土地财政来促进经济增长,不同区域的地级市政府则偏好于吸引外商直接投资来促进经济增长。本文提出:应适当引入不同省份辖区内地级城市间的横向税收竞争,适当抑制省域内经济发展水平相近的地级城市间的税收竞争。

Within the spatial interaction strategy analysis framework,what effect will the Chinese fiscal decentralization have on the regional economic growth? From the angle of the finance competition among governments,this paper empirically analyzes the effects of strategy interaction features on the government revenues of 232 cities by building spatial Dubin model and multilevel model from the aspects of vertical competition and horizontal competition. The results show that: Chinese fiscal decentralization is different from federal financial system and there is no vertical competition. In order to promote economic growth within a region,vertical competition often compromise on the surface and innovates in system,while the group effects present more in horizontal competition. Regional governments deliberately decrease the tax collection efficiency to promote the economy growth. Prefectural-level governments in the same region prefer the land finance to promote the economy growth,while prefectural-level city governments in different region prefer attracting foreign direct investment and land finance. This paper proposes that the horizontal tax competition between prefecture level cities in different provinces should introduce the horizontal tax competition mechanism while tax competition should be appropriately suppressed prefecture level cities in similar economic development level.