基于委托代理的闭环供应链风险分担契约协调研究

Research on Risk Sharing Coordination of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Principal-agent Theory

考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的闭环供应链系统,制造商和零售商之间同时存在委托销售和委托回收关系,本文针对信息不对称条件下闭环供应链存在的"道德风险"问题,根据委托代理理论构建了闭环供应链风险分担博弈模型。研究表明:最优风险分担契约能使闭环供应链总收益最大化,同时使制造商、零售商之间实现更为合理的利益共享和风险共担,从而达到了闭环供应链协调的目的。在此模型基础上,本文又引入政府补贴风险分担因子,结果使得零售商的收益分享比例和努力程度,销售总量和回收总量,以及闭环供应链的总收益均有所增加,最后通过数值算例分析验证了模型的可行性和科学性。

Considering a closed-loop supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,there is a principal-agent relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer in the activities of sales and recycling. Aiming at "moral risks"in the closed-loop supply chains under the circumstance of information asymmetry,this essay constructs a scientific game model of risk sharing in closed-loop supply chain on the basis of the principal-agent theory. The research shows that the optimal risk-sharing contract can not only maximize the total benefits of the closed-loop supply chain,but also achieve the reasonable interests distribution and risk sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer,and thus the purpose of closed-loop supply chain coordination is achieved. Based on the original model,the risk sharing factor of government subsidies is introduced. The results show that it can increase retailer’s revenue-sharing ratio and retailer’s efforts,and the total output of sales and recycling as well as the total benefits of the closedloop supply chain also increase. Finally,the feasibility and scientificity of the model are verified by a numerical example analysis.