地方政府邻避冲突协商治理创新扩散研究

A Study of the Diffusion of Innovations of Local Government’s Consultation Governance in NIMBY Conflict

2007-2017年,从厦门PX事件到湖北仙桃垃圾焚烧事件来看,在维稳压力驱动、中央政策倡导和地方政府的理性学习下,地方政府邻避冲突的协商治理创新(信息公开、吸纳公众参与、风险沟通、损益补偿等)呈现扩散态势。但是,亡羊补牢式的协商治理与邻避困境的依然存在表明:这种“高风险、弱激励”创新扩散存在着随机性,在不能带来明显政策收益或不能吸引政策注意力时,基层协商治理创新扩散会遭遇瓶颈。因此,强化并完善激励约束机制是促进地方政府邻避冲突协商治理创新扩散的基本思路。

From Xiamen PX-Project Incident in 2007 to Waste Incineration Incident of Xiantao in Hubei Prov ince in 2017, with the driving of the pressure of safeguard stability, the advocacy from central-government poli cy, and rational learning by local government, the innovation of local government’s consultation governance in NIMBY conflict (information disclosure, public participation, risk communication, profit and loss compensation, etc.) is spreading. However, the existence of remedial consultation governance and NIMBY dilemma shows that such a“ high-risk, weak-incentive”diffusion of innovations is random and the diffusion of innovations of con sultative democracy at the grassroots level will encounter bottlenecks when it cannot bring obvious policy bene fits or absorb policy attention. Therefore, strengthening and improving the incentive and restraint mechanism is the basic idea to promote the diffusion of innovations of local government’s consultation governance in NIMBY conflict.