从莫斯到列维—斯特劳斯：“玛纳”与实践观念的可译性

From Mauss to Lévi-Strauss:“Mana” and the Translatability of Practical Ideas

"玛纳"这一典型的巫术概念构成了社会人类学的一个经典"案例"。莫斯与列维-斯特劳斯对它的不同诠释体现了从法国社会学派到结构主义人类学的转折及分歧。本文从莫斯的文本出发将"玛纳"定义为"实践观念",并以"可译性"为切入点,试图证明在"实践观念可译性"问题上的分歧背后隐含着社会本体论、社会科学方法论和行动哲学这三个层面的分歧。最后,本文认为,关于莫斯与列维-斯特劳斯之关系的最常见观点实际上是对这一关系的过度简化。

"Mana",an emblematic magic notion,constitutes a classic case in social anthropology.The different interpretations of mana by Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss represent a shift of theoretical paradigm from the French school of sociology to the structural anthropology.On the surface,the division between Mauss and Lévi-Strauss seems to be the translatability of"Mana".To Mauss,mana is non-translatable and,more to the point,it shouldn’t be translated into modern scientific language at all.For Lévi-Strauss,mana is not only translatable but also must be interpreted in modern scientific language.This paper begins its inquiry with Mauss and Hubert’s General Theory on Magic by treating mana as a"practical idea".It is argued that beneath the disagreement over the translatability,there are deeper divisions involving social ontology,definition of objects of social sciences,and relationship between theoretical and practical logic.The paper suggests that the conventional view concerning the relationship between Mauss’ holism and Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism is an oversimplified argument that ignores the fact that Lévi-Strauss not only disagrees with Mauss about the relation between "social reality"and "symbolism",but their quintessence as well.