制度、契约与绩效的一个数学模型分析——以转型升级为例

A Mathematical Model Analysis of Institution,Contract and Performance

目前,制度、契约与绩效之间关系的分析还缺乏较完备的数学模型。契约各方纵向一体化程度决定调适能力,调适作用在对齐差异、形成互惠时引起交易成本、产生分工收益;交易制度能转移交易成本、分工收益和净收益。纳入上述要素关系及指标后形成较完备的数学模型,可应用于契约和制度选择对绩效作用的分析。案例结论得出,较高的创新水平要求较高的组织一体化程度和激励水平,转型升级要求交易制度对不同的创新水平予以准确区分和差别化激励。

At present,there is no complete mathematical model to analyze the relationship between institution,contract and performance. The degree of vertical integration of the contracting parties determines the adjustment ability,the adjustment effect causes transaction cost and profit of division of labor when aligning differences and forming reciprocity;transaction institution can transfer transaction cost,profit of division of labor and net profit. After the above factors and indicators are included,a complete mathematical model can be applied to analysis of contract and institution selection on performance effect.The conclusion of the case shows that higher innovation level requires higher organizational integration level and incentive level,while transformation and upgrading requires transaction institution to distinguish the different innovation levels accurately and differentiated incentives.