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AR/VR体验下制造商对线下零售商的选择研究

Analysis of Manufacturers’ Selection on Offline Retailers Under AR/VR Experience
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摘要 在AR/VR体验下,对制造商选择线下零售商进行产品销售的条件进行了分析。以电商分销商享有定价主导权为前提,构建了产品制造商、电商分销商以及线下零售商的两阶段动态博弈模型。一是有线下零售商参与的多渠道产品定价策略模型,二是无线下零售商参与的双渠道产品定价策略模型。并考虑了在AR/VR体验下,线下零售商的消费者在这两阶段的策略行为。研究表明:在AR/VR体验背景下,保证线下零售商参与市场,制造商选择线下零售商进行产品的销售受到了电商分销商对产品批发价的主导程度λ、线下零售渠道的转换消费者所占比例t的共同影响。文章的研究结论可为AR/VR体验下制造商选择线下零售商提供有力的理论解释和行动指南。 Under the experience of AR /VR ,this study analyzes the conditions which the manufacturer chooses the retailer to sell the product.Considering large-scale distributor with pricing power,it constructs a two-stage dynamic game model for product manufacturers,large distributors and offline retailer.One is the multi-channel product pricing strategy model which offline retailer participating in ,the second is the dual-channel product pricing strategy model without offline retailer.Taking the retailer s behavior into these two stages of the strategic under the experience of AR/VR the research shows:under the experience of AR/VR , manufacturers choose the offline retailer to sell the product influenced by large distributor responses for the wholesale price level of product and the proportion of convert consumers.The conclusions of this study can provide a strong theoretical explanation and action guide for manufacturers selecting offline retailer under the experience of AR/VR .
作者 罗定提 王柏森 LUO Ding-ti;WANG Bai-sen(Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China)
出处 《南华大学学报(社会科学版)》 2019年第4期67-74,共8页 Journal of University of South China(Social Science Edition)
关键词 AR/VR体验 动态博弈 定价策略模型 定价主导权 转换消费者 experience of AR/VR dynamic game pricing strategy model pricing power convert consumers
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