公司治理是否导致商业银行风险承担增大——基于16家商业银行面板数据的实证检验

Whether corporate governance leads to the increase of risk-taking of commercial banks?——Empirical study based on the panel data of 16 commercial banks

随着我国利率市场化改革步伐加快、外资银行涌入及互联网金融异军突起,商业银行面临着前所未有的竞争压力。为求发展,各大银行纷纷加大公司治理力度,引发人们对公司治理是否会增大商业银行风险承担的担忧。为此,本文选取16家上市银行10年的数据,通过建立模型实证检验公司治理对商业银行风险承担的切实影响。结果表明,公司治理确实导致商业银行风险承担增大,其中高管薪酬激励中过强的股权激励和大股东控制力的不断增加是最重要的影响因素。同时,不合理的董事会规模、独立董事比例和监事会规模都会导致商业银行风险承担增大。

With the rapid pace of interest rate liberalization in China, the influx of foreign banks and the emergence of Internet finance, the commercial banks are facing the unprecedented competitive pressure.In order to develop better, the banks all have strengthened the corporate governance, which has caused the public concern over whether corporate governance will increase the risk-taking of commercial banks or not.Therefore, selecting the panel data of 16 listed banks in nearly 10 years, this article constructs the model to empirically study the effect of corporate governance on the risk-taking of commercial banks.The results show that corporate governance really leads to the increase of risk-taking of commercial banks, and too strong equity incentive for executive compensation and the increasing control of major shareholders are the most important factors.Meanwhile, the unreasonable board size, ratio of independent directors and size of the board of supervisors all will increase the risk-taking of commercial banks.