碳捕获与碳封存机制下跨界污染控制微分博弈

A Differential Game of Transboundary Pollution for Carbon Capture and Storage

考虑碳捕获与碳封存过程中知识积累的影响,扩展Bertinelli等的跨界污染控制微分博弈模型,分析两个对称国家在开环战略、马尔科夫纳什均衡战略以及合作3种博弈战略下的碳捕获与碳封存博弈行为及博弈结果。研究发现,在合作战略下博弈参与国捕获与封存的二氧化碳数量最多,马尔科夫纳什均衡战略次之,开环战略下捕获与封存的二氧化碳数量最少。此外,知识积累对跨界污染治理行为具有重要影响,随着知识积累的增加,碳捕获与碳封存的成本降低,尤其是知识积累效率的提高,促使博弈参与国进行更多的碳捕获与碳封存。

Considering the influence of knowledge accumulation on carbon capture and storage, this paper extended the transboundary pollution control differential game model of Bertinelli to analyze the game behavior and game results in carbon capture and storage of two symmetrical countries which adopted the open-loop, the Markovian Nash, and the cooperation strategy, respectively. The results show that the cooperation strategy can lead to the highest overall environmental quality, followed by the Markovian Nash equilibrium strategy. The participants who adopt the open-loop strategy make the least effort in carbon capture and storage. In addition, knowledge accumulation has an important influence on transboundary pollution control. The cost of carbon capture and storage declines with the increase of knowledge accumulation. In particular, improving the efficiency of knowledge accumulation leads to more carbon capture and storage.