退出威胁能抑制“铁公鸡”公司的不分红行为吗?

Does Exit Threatening Curb Non-Dividend Payout Behavior of “Iron Roosters”?

本文探讨了大股东的退出威胁在抑制"铁公鸡"公司的不分红行为过程中所发挥的作用,并结合公司内外治理机制综合考察该作用所呈现的差别性特征。研究发现,大股东的退出威胁能抑制不分红行为。进而,当内在治理机制较不完善时,即控股股东持股比例越高、大股东持股比例相对于控股股东更低时,抑制作用更显著;当外在治理机制较不完善时,即外部审计质量越低时,抑制作用更显著。该结论经多种稳健性检验和替代性解释排除后仍然成立。

This paper explores the role played by the exit threatening of large shareholder's "voting with their feet" in curbing "Iron Rooster" listed companies' non-dividend payout behaviors.It also examines the distinctive features of this relationship by combining the company's internal and external governance mechanisms.The result shows that exit threatening of large shareholders curbs "Iron Rooster" listed companies' non-dividend payout behavior.Furthermore,when corporate internal governance is relatively rough,or in other words,the higher the shareholding percentage of controlling shareholder,the lower the ratio of large shareholder's holding compared with controlling shareholder's holding,the more significant the curbing effect is.When the corporate external governance is relatively rough,that is to say,the lower the quality of the external auditing,the more significant the cubing effect is.The conclusions are still valid after many robustness tests and alternative explanations.