碳排放权的非对称拍卖模型及其配置效率

An asymmetric auction model of carbon emission rights and its allocation efficiency

作为我国碳交易体系的试金石,“七省市”试点运营状况如何?是学界和管理层特别关注的一个焦点问题.以碳排放权的初始配置准则为切入点,展开理论探讨与定性分析,发现:在现行的溯源免费配置准则下,试点地区的碳交易市场有明显的“聚类效应”特征,其原因是排放权的误配导致企业逆向选择所致.为了从机制设计本源上消除企业减排的逆向选择,把拍卖有偿配置准则引入碳交易市场中,构建企业减排投资回报率指标,定义排放权的社会最优配置,建立碳排放权的非对称拍卖模型,分析异质性企业在碳排放权拍卖中的投标策略及其拍卖前的减排投资决策行为,剖析企业所有权差异对其减排投资和排放权配置结果的影响,阐述政府补贴企业减排投资的政策效果,基于政府补贴政策效果提出完善我国碳交易市场的相关建议.

At present, researchers and managers are concerned with the performance of the seven carbontrading pilots in China. Hence, this paper theoretically analyzes their performances from the initial allocation viewpoint of carbon emission rights. It is found that there exists a clustering effect of carbon trading in the pilots. The underlying reason for it is because of the mismatch of permits and the consequent adverse selection of enterprises. To eliminate the adverse selection from mechanism design, the paper introduces auctioning into the carbon-trading market. Moreover, based on China, s actual conditions, an asymmetric auction model of rights is developed by constructing the abatement investment return index and defining the socially optimal rights allocation. In our model, enterprises' asymmetric equilibrium bidding strategies and their abatement investment decision before the auction are investigated, respectively. Then, the effects of the enterprise ownership differences on abatement investment and allocation are examined. Finally, the effectiveness regarding the low-carbon government subsidy is discussed and associated options are suggested in order to improve China' s carbon-trading market.