风险投资与高管辞职套现——来自创业板的经验证据

Venture Capital and Executives’ Resignation and Equity Cash-out:Evidence from ChiNext

针对我国上市公司高管辞职套现多发的问题,本文聚焦于多风险投资支持的创业板,以风险投资"进入→参与治理→退出"过程为线索,探索其对创业板高管辞职套现行为产生的影响。本文以手工收集的2009-2016年创业板571家上市公司高管辞职套现与风投背景数据为样本,实证研究发现:有风险投资支持的创业板上市公司发生高管辞职套现的概率显著更低;风投机构委派董监事参与公司治理,将显著降低公司发生高管辞职套现的可能性,且当风投与公司距离较近时监管作用更明显;风险投资的减持退出会影响监督力度和公司股票表现,从而又加剧高管的辞职套现。本文从风投如何直接影响高管的去留与套现选择的视角进行突破,为创业板企业的治理、风险投资的参与和市场监管的完善提供了经验证据和参考建议。

In recent years, a large portion of executives resign and sell their shares in listed companies in China, especially executives from ChiNext. In view of a high percentage of venture-backed companies on ChiNext, we study the impact of venture capital's support, governance and exit on the executives' resignation and equity cash-out. Based on a hand-collected sample of 571 listed companies on ChiNext from 2009to 2016, we find that the probability of the executives' resignation and cash-out is significantly lower in venture-backed companies than non-venture-backed companies. Specially, in venture-backed companies,the probability will be reduced if there are directors or supervisors delegated by VC. Furthermore, VC exit leads to a rebound in the executives' resignation and equity cash-out due to the weakening of supervision and the negative impact on the company's stock. We address the research gap of how VC's entry and exit directly affects the executives' choices of leaving and cash-out. In doing so, we provide relevant suggestions for listed companies on ChiNext, venture capitalists and market regulators.