不同公平偏好信息结构下旅游供应链定价策略研究

Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain under Different Fairness Preference Information Structure

建立了由一个占主导地位的景区和一个处于跟随地位的旅行社组成的旅游供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,引入旅行社的公平偏好特征,研究不同公平偏好信息结构对旅游供应链定价策略和利润的差异化影响。结果表明:与无公平偏好情形下的结果相比,旅行社的公平偏好能够显著影响旅游供应链成员的定价策略和利润,且在不同的公平偏好信息结构下,所起到的作用机制和影响效果具有明显的差异性。景区关注旅行社的公平偏好对其自身不利,但对旅行社有利,且能够有效维护供应链合作伙伴关系;景区不关注旅行社的公平偏好,对其自身、旅行社和旅游供应链整体均不利。

A Stackelberg game model for tourism supply chain composed of a scenic spot and a travel agency is established,and the fairness preference of the travel agency is introduced into the model.The influence of different fairness preference information structures on pricing strategy and profit of tourism supply chain are analyzed in the case of the scenic spot dominating the supply chain.The results show that:compared with the results in the case of no fairness preference,the fairness preference of travel agency can significantly affect the pricing strategy and profit of members of the tourism supply chain,and the effect of the fairness preference are obviously different under different information structures.Although there is a bad consequence for the scenic spot to consider the travel agency's fair preference,it is beneficial to travel agency and can effectively maintain the supply chain partnership.If the scenic spot do not pay attention to the fairness preference of travel agency,it will be bad for all the supply chain members.